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THE FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF AMALGAMATION:  THE CASE 







The rapid population and economic growth of the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) in the late 1940’s 
and early 1950’s put a significant strain on the financial and administrative capabilities of the 
existing municipal governments.  However, the existing municipalities wanted to preserve local 
interest and citizen participation. The province’s solution was a two-tier system of local 
government that more or less satisfied both objectives
. (1)   
 
The new upper-tier Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto was created in 1954 to provide 
services for the whole community, where spillover effects or economies of scale were important. 
At the same time, the individual communities retained their autonomy over local services.  
 
In the 1995 provincial election, a new Progressive Conservative government was elected under a 
platform called the “Common Sense Revolution.”   The government promised smaller 
government, less red tape, and lower taxes. In the case of the municipalities, it promised to 
reduce duplication and lower the costs of local government. It also promised to clarify the 
functions of the provincial and municipal governments. 
(2)  
 
In 1996, the new provincial government set up the provincial-municipal, “Who Does What 
Taskforce” headed by David Crombie, a former mayor of the City of Toronto, to look at the 
question of disentangling provincial-municipal relationships.  It made its report in late 1996.
 (3)  
 
In January 1997, the provincial government made a series of policy announcements proposing 
new legislation for education, market value property assessment, and the redistribution of the 
responsibilities between the provincial and municipal governments. Most of the announcements 
involved the downloading of costs on the municipalities for programs that were previously paid 
for by the province or cost-shared with the municipalities
. (4)  
 
The province looked at the amalgamation of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto in 1996. 
To help make a decision, it hired KPMG Consulting to prepare a report on the savings and costs 
of amalgamation.
 (5) The province’s stated goal was to reduce costs by eliminating duplication 
and to improve the efficiency of the delivery of services.  The KPMG report estimated that the 
annual cost savings from amalgamation would be $82-$112 million.  They also estimated 
additional annual efficiency savings of $148 to $252 million by the year 2000.  The 2  
Table 1 
City of Toronto 
Savings and Costs from Amalgamation up to December 2000 
(millions of dollars) 
 
Saving or Cost  Area of Saving or Cost 
 





Actual Annual Saving 
 
 
Total Annual Saving 
$150     from Tax Supported Amalgamated Programs 




$136     from Tax Supported Amalgamated Programs 
  $17     from Rate Supported Programs 
      0     from Efficiency Savings 






Total Annual Cost 
 
 
One-time Transition Cost 
$153     from Service Level Harmonization 
  N/A    from Wage Harmonization 
  $29     from Annual Financing Costs (for a ten year period) 
$182  
    
 
  $75     from Staff Exit Costs 
    $5     from Retraining Costs 
  $83     from Business Information Costs 
  $82     from Facility Consolidation and Modification Costs 
 
  $30     from Other Costs 
Total                                                $275 
 
 
Source:  Toronto Staff Report To Budget Advisory Committee “Summary of Amalgamation 
Savings and Costs”, March 9, 2001, Appendix B 
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total annual savings were estimated at $230 to $364 per year by the year 2000.    The one-time 
amalgamation costs were estimated at  $150 to $220 million.
6) 
 
The province decided to proceed with the amalgamation by passing Bill 103, the City of Toronto 
Act in 1996. 
(7) This was done in spite of the fact that on March 3, 1997, a referendum was held 
on amalgamation in the six local municipalities and from 70 to 81% of the voters were opposed 
to it. Bill 103 set out the political structure of the new City of Toronto (City) and authorized the 
transfer of assets and liabilities and the by-laws of the previous seven municipalities to the new 
City of Toronto. The Act also created two boards to supervise the transition from the old 
structure to the new one. The transitional boards were the Financial Advisory Board and the 
Transition Team. Both were dissolved on January 31, 1998. 
 
This paper will look at two aspects of the changes.  The first is the financial implications  
of the amalgamation.  The second is the financial consequences of the decision to redistribute the 
responsibilities of the provincial and the municipal governments.  Cost estimates as well as the 
estimates of the other financial implications will be provided for both topics.  
AMALGAMATION SAVINGS AND COSTS 
AMMALGAMATION SAVINGS  
When the city was amalgamated in 1998, it set 3-year annual targets for cost reductions.  The 
targets were 10% of the $1.5 billion budget for newly amalgamated programs that were tax 
supported, or $150 million per year.  The city excluded expenditures for programs that were 
previously amalgamated under the former Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto (Metro).  They 
made up about 73% of the new city’s operating budget. 
(8) 
(9) The city also set an additional 10% 
target on the $173 million budgeted for rate supported programs, such as water and wastewater.  
The annual target was $167.3 million. 
(10)   
 
Table 1 shows the cost savings achieved by the city up to the end of 2000.  The data show that 
most programs met their targets. The city was able to achieve annual savings of $49.6 million in 
1998, $64.4 million in 1999 and $19.5 million in 2000.  By the end of 2000, annual cost savings 
directly related to amalgamation were $136.2 million for the property tax supported programs 




Because most municipal costs are related to staffing, most of the cost savings involved 
reductions in the workforce.  These included eliminating vacant positions, attrition, retirements, 
voluntary exits and targeted exits. The report notes that there was a reduction of 60% in 
executive management positions in the seven former municipalities. 
(12)    
AMMALGAMATION COSTS  
One-Time Costs 
 
The city also faced one-time costs from amalgamation.  These were transition costs to 
consolidate and integrate the various programs of the amalgamated municipalities. 
(13) By the end 4  
of 2000, these costs were $275 million.  Some of the costs would have been incurred even 
without amalgamation. Therefore, all of the costs are not directly related to amalgamation
. (14) 
 
Annual Amalgamation Costs 
Annual amalgamation costs include three sets of costs.  
 
(a) The Harmonization of Services and User Fees 
 
These costs arose from the need to equalize services and fees for waste and recycling collection, 
winter maintenance, public health, parks and recreation user fees, and boulevard and parking 
fees. The five services were identified by the new city as having the most significant differences 
in service levels or user fees when amalgamation took place.  The financial constraints faced by 
the new city prevented these services and fees from being harmonized at the highest level, as is 
normally the case. Instead, services levels are being reduced in some parts of the new city areas 
and raised in other parts. Fees are being harmonized in the same way. 
(15)  
   
Up to the end of 2000, the cost of harmonization was  $15.3 million. Since the process is still 
underway, the costs will continue to rise.  When the services and fees are fully harmonized, the 
city expects that annual costs will be reduced by  $17.8 million. 
(16)  
 
(b) The Harmonization of Wages and Salaries 
 
Prior to amalgamation, Metro and each of the six local municipalities paid their employees 
different wages and salaries for the same jobs. The City harmonized the wages and salaries for 
management and its non-union workforce first. The estimated cost was $2 million. 
(17) 
The issues were more complex for the unionised workforce since the new City faced 56 separate 
collective agreements in the seven former municipalities. 
(18) In March and April of 2000, the 
unionized inside and outside workers went on strike. 
(19)  
 
The contracts negotiated by the City reduced the number of bargaining units and collective 
agreements from 56 to 6. 
(20) The negotiations also settled a large number of issues involving 
harmonization. However, the key demand for the harmonization of wage rates and benefits was 
not settled in the negotiations, and the issue was sent to arbitration and mediation. 
(21) 
The reduction of the differentials is inevitable even if the union’s demands were not met at this 
stage of arbitration.  The increased costs can be offset to some extent by a continued reduction of 
employment, a reduction of services, and through the possibly privatisation of some services.  





A recent arbitration award involving the firefighters was reported in the Globe and Mail. 
(24) The 
arbitrator harmonized the firefighters’ wages at the highest rate paid in the six former  
municipalities. The firefighters were also given wage parity with a first-class Toronto Police 
constable.  The city estimated the cost of this wage harmonization component at $3 million.
 (25)   
 
The Globe and Mail article quoted a city councillor as estimating the cost of the award at $18.3 5  
million for 2001. The awards are also to be made retroactive, but the how far back they will go 
was not announced when the first decision was made.  Benefits are also to be harmonized and 
made retroactive. The newspaper story quotes the same city councillor’s estimate of a retroactive 
wage award back to 1998 at $50 million.  The councillor also estimated the non-wage costs of 
amalgamating the six former fire departments at about $100 million. These costs included a new 
radio system, a new computer system and other costs to standardize equipment. 
Given what has already happened, the overall costs of amalgamation will be much higher than 
the city’s estimate.  This is especially true for the wage and salary bill. 
(26) 
 
(c) Annual Financing Costs 
 
The one-time transition costs were funded by drawing $80 million from the City’s reserves and 
by a $195 million provincial loan. The annual debt payments are estimated at $29 million over a 
ten-year period. 
(27) The City’s debt burden has also been growing because of downloading.   
Indeed, this is a much more serious problem and it will be discussed later under the financial 
costs of downloading.      
 




Ontario municipalities faced major financial problems because of the actions taken by the  
current provincial government.  In the election campaign of 1995, the Progressive  
Conservative Party promised to cut the provincial income tax. It also promised to  
redistribute the responsibilities of the provincial and municipal governments.  
(28) Downloading 
costs on the municipalities was one way that the provincial government could meet its 
commitment to cut the income tax.  However, downloading costs made it difficult for the 
municipalities to support their spending on social services and other programs. 
 
The Consequences of Downloading 
 
The redistribution of responsibilities for social and other programs between the province and the 
municipalities are summarized in Appendix Table 1. 
(29) Under the reforms, the province 
continued to set program standards, but the municipalities became responsible for running the 
programs and for paying a larger share of their costs from the property tax and user fees. 
 
The social service programs involve a redistribution of income from taxpayers as a  
whole to low-income households. In the public finance literature, local government is not  
viewed as the most effective level of government to operate such programs because  
mobility would offset attempts to redistribute income. 
(30) Property taxpayers could avoid  
paying for the programs by moving outside of the municipality’s boundaries. The  
availability of social service programs would also attract migrants to the municipality.  
The net effect would be to reduce tax revenue and increase the demand for social services.  
Income redistribution programs are more effective at higher levels of government, such as the 
provincial and federal governments, where mobility is less important.   By shifting the 
responsibility and cost of social service programs from the provincial level to the municipal 6  
level, the operation of the programs was made less effective. 
 
A related argument involves the type of tax used to pay for income redistribution programs.  
Before the reforms, social services were paid for by the provincial government, by 
intergovernmental transfers from the province to the municipality, and by income raised by the 
municipality from property taxes and user fees.  After the reforms, most of the revenue came 
from the property tax and from user fees.  
 
The conventional view in public finance is that broadly based taxes are a more effective  
way of raising funds for redistribution programs than the local property tax. 
(31) The  
problem  could be remedied by allowing municipalities to tax incomes earned in the  
municipality 
 
Another problem is related to the generation of spillover effects.  Toronto’s rapid economic  
growth and generous social service programs have attracted migrants from the rest of the GTA 
and Canada.  Canada’s Immigration and Refugee programs have also attracted immigrants from 
other countries to the City of Toronto and increased Toronto’s social services costs since the 
immigrants and refugees are eligible for welfare payments and other social services.  Therefore, 
the inflows from elsewhere have created negative externalities for Toronto.  This argument alone 
provides a strong justification for provincial and federal government funding.  
 
Empirical evidence on this point is provided by a recent study prepared by the Canadian  
Council for Social Development. 
(32) Based on data from the 1996 Census and Statistics  
Canada’s definition of low-income households, the study found that central cities are  
attractive locations for the urban poor
. (33) About one-half of all the Census Metropolitan  
Area’s (CMA’s) populations lived in the central cities, but the central cities had two- 
thirds of the low-income households.
 (34  
 
In the Toronto CMA, 27.6% of all households living in the former Metro Toronto fell  
below the low-income cut-off.   Metro’s rate was 10% higher than Ontario, and 8% 
higher than Canada as a whole. The Toronto CMA also had the largest number of low-income 
immigrants of any city in Canada. People born outside of Canada made up 47.7% of the Toronto 
CMA’s total population and 56.7% of these people who lived below the low-income cut-off. 
This share was 11.3% higher than for people born in Canada who lived in the Toronto CMA. 
 
Financial Consequences for the City of Toronto 
 
The provincial government began to download costs in July 1995 although the full  
impact was not felt until 1998. 
(35) The problems faced by the City of Toronto are illustrated  
in Table 2, which shows the City’s annual net budget expenditures for selected social service 
programs.  These programs were the ones most affected by downloading. Net expenditures are 
the amounts that are funded by the property tax. They are net of all other sources of revenue. 7  
                                              Table 2 
                                                  City of Toronto 
                                                  Net Expenditure on Selected Social Services, 














































Children’s  Services  41.3 32.5  41.5 52.8 57.3 78.7  127.7  127.3  108.4 
Long-term Care and Homes for the Aged  23.2  23.2  14.8  27.0  25.9  100.0  63.8  182.4  95.8 
Shelters, Housing and Support  14.2  273.4  271.3  270.6  270.9  1925.4  99.2  99.7  100.1 
Library  107.8 104.5 97.9 103.2 110.3  96.9  93.7 105.4 106.9 
Public  Health  47.1 83.5  49.6 57.1 59.7  177.3 59.4  115.2  104.6 
Social  Assistance    162.6 281.1  255.3 259.6 234.9 172.9  90.8 101.7  90.5 
            
Sub-total    396.2 798.2  730.4 770.3 758.9 201.5  91.5  1.05  98.5 
   
Total Net Operating Costs                                          2,571.7        2,531.2      2,536.1     2,598.9      2,737.7         98.4%         100.2%      102.5%    105.3%  
 
Percent of Total Net Operating Costs                           15.4%           31.5%       28.8%     29.64%     27.72%                    
 
Notes: 
Net Expenditures are the amounts that are funded by the property tax.  They are net of all other sources  
Of revenue.   
The approved budget for 2000 is the budget approved by City Council for January 1 to December 31, 2000,  
net of all other sources of revenue. 
The approved budget for 2001 is the budget approved by City Council for January 1 to December 31, 2001,  
net of all other sources of revenue. 
 
Source: 
City of Toronto, “1998 Operating Program, as recommended by the Budget Committee”, April 20, 1998. 
City of Toronto, “1999 Operating Budget as recommended by the Budget Committee”, April 12, 1999. 
The approved budgets for 2000 and 2001 were obtained directly from the City of Toronto, Budget Services.8  
Column 1 shows the 1997 actual net expenditures on social services for Metropolitan Toronto 
and its six lower-tier municipalities. Columns 2 and 3 show the same information for the new 
City of Toronto for 1998 and 1999. Columns 4 and 5 show the approved but not the actual 
expenditures for 2000 and 2001. The actual expenditures for 2000 are not yet available. 
The impact of downloading is shown in the next four columns. Column 6 shows that net 
expenditures on the selected social services programs more than double between 1997 (before 
Amalgamation and downloading) and 1998 (after Amalgamation and downloading).  The new 
City experienced large cost increases compared with 1997 in Shelters, Housing and Support, 
Public Health, and Social Assistance.
 
From January 1997 to March 2000, nineteen changes were made to the provincial downloading 
program.  Some of these changes increased costs while others, especially after 1998, reduced 
them as the province made adjustments in response to municipal complaints.  In 1998, the 
province introduced the pooling of expenditures on social welfare, social housing and on Go 
Transit among all of the GTA municipalities. 
(36) 
 
The Local Service Realignment  (LSR) Program pooled expenditures on social assistance, 
hostels and social housing based on a formula using the weighted average assessment values in 
each of the GTA’s municipalities.  The inclusion of different tax rates in the formula is also 
allowed, if it is unanimously agreed upon by all of the municipalities. 
(37) The LSR Program was 
an attempt to internalise the negative externalities for the city by pooling costs with the rest of 
the GTA.  The GTA cost equalization shares are set by provincial regulation.   Because the rest 
of the GTA is growing faster than the City of Toronto, the city’s share of  pooled social service 
costs will fall over time. In 1998, the city’s share was 52.4%.  In 1999 it had fallen to 51.57%.  
For 2001, it was set at 50.9%. 
(38) 
 
Go Transit costs are also pooled based on assessment, ridership and service levels. The Greater 
Toronto Service Board (GTSB) sets the share for each member municipality that supports the Go 
Transit system. The city’s share of GO Transit costs was set at 49.9% in 1999.  For the year 




Column 7 of Table 2 shows how the city began to adjust to the new financial environment.  
Between 1998 and 1999, the data show only one cost increase, for Children’s Services.  
Decreases are shown for all the other categories.  In Public Health, most of the reduction came 
from a change in provincial government policy that increased their contributions to the program.
 
(40) The reduction in social assistance spending came about from the falling unemployment rate 
as the Canadian economy moved back to full employment, and from cost cutting and increased 
user fees. 
(41) Cost cutting and increased user fees place an increased burden on the city’s poor. 
 
Between 1999 and 2000, the city’s cost for most social services increased. This was especially 
true for Long-term Care and Homes for the Aged.  The increase was related to the continuing 
implementation of downloading and cost increases. 
 
Column 9 of the Table shows that in the most recent budget, significant cost cutting occurred, 




Table 3 shows estimates of the net downloading cost for 1997 to 1999 and for 2001.  The net 
costs consist of the increased operating cost from downloading less the amounts that the local 
Boards of Education received when the province assumed responsibility for education. Since the 
city previously financed education from the property tax, the provincial government education 
grants, also obtained from the property tax, are viewed as a reduction of the burden on city 
taxpayers.  The net data show a significant increase of $101.9 million between 1997 and 1998.  
Between 1998 and 1999, downloading costs fall by $61.5 million.  However, for 2001 
downloading cost increased as a result of the reduction in net operating costs for the reasons 
discussed earlier and the large increase in the city’s payments to support the operating costs of 
public transit (GO and the TTC).  
 
The remaining costs in Table 3 show the loss of the capital grants for public transit.  As noted in 
Table 3, the amounts may be overestimates because the city neglected to fully account for the 
$829 million payment from the province to support the new Sheppard subway and other TTC 
capital costs. 
 
In 1998, 1999 and 2000, the city did not increase the tax rate on residential property.  It has been 
sheltering residential taxpayers from the increased downloading costs with grants from the  
province and through increased borrowing.  In 1998, the province gave the city a $50 million 
grant to help it finance its increased expenditures. The city also obtained $100 million dollar 
loans from the province in 1999 and in 2000. The repayment of the $200 million debt will start 
in 2001 and it will be funded by selling debentures to the capital market 
(42) 
 
Of greater significance is the city’s borrowing to finance the capital expenditures of the TTC.  
Under provincial law, municipalities can borrow to finance capital costs but not operating costs. 
Downloading has shifted the capital cost of public transit to the municipalities.  In 2001, the TTC 
capital costs were estimated at $247 million.  These costs are to be financed by borrowing.  The 
debt service costs of the borrowing are estimated at $40 million per year. Clearly, the growth of 
debt servicing is going to place a significant strain on the city’s future operating cost budget. The 
Chief Financial Officer of the city has recently released a report on the future consequences of 




The Implications of Downloading for the Future 
 
Determining the budget for 2001 was a major problem this year.  The city’s Budget Committee 
spent 3 months cutting programs and increasing user charges. In April, the Budget Committee 
still faced a deficit of $143 million.  Negotiations with the province produced $125 million in 
grants, loans and adjustments to programs.  The committee recommended that the remaining $48 
million be covered by a residential property tax increase of 5%. 
(44) Without significant 
provincial and federal government help in the future, large residential tax increases may have to 
be imposed to maintain services. If this does not happen, the city will have to cut its services 
significantly.     
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Table 3 
The Net Downloading of Costs by the Province of Ontario 
on the New City of Toronto, 1998 to 1999, and 2001 

























at Year End 
Operating Costs (1) 
 
















Net Operating Costs  0   120.1     28.2     29.5 
Capital Costs (TTC Subsidy Loss) (2) 
 
Total                                                                        


















        
Source:  The 1997 data are from the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, 1997 Operating Plan and Budget Toronto, February 26, 1997. 
The data in columns 2 and 3 are from the City of Toronto, “Provincial Downloading-Local Services Realignment,” 
A Report Prepared for the Policy and Finance Committee by the Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer, December 1, 1999. 
The data for 2001 were obtained from the City of Toronto, Treasury and Financial Services Division. No data are available for 2000.  
(1). Operating costs also include subsidies for GO Transit and for the Toronto Transit Commission. 
(2). The capital cost of the TTC subsidy may be overstated for 1998 and 1999 because the province gave the city a $829 million payment for the 

































1  Oakville      264,000  1.3912%      $ 3,673     $ 32 
2  Toronto      300,000  1.2137%      $ 3,641      - 
3  Pickering      219,000  1.5063%      $ 3,299     ($ 342) 
4  Burlington      227,000  1.4109%      $ 3,203     ($ 438) 
5  Ajax      192,000  1.6427%      $ 3,154     ($ 487) 
6  Hamilton      157,000  1.8752%      $ 2,944     ($ 697) 
7  Oshawa      163,000  1.7614%      $ 2,871     ($ 770) 
8  Whitby      175,000  1.6250%      $ 2,844     ($ 797) 
9  Richmond Hill      210,000  1.3097%      $ 2,750     ($ 891) 
10  Markham      190,000  1.3044%      $ 2,478    ($ 1,163) 
11  Vaughan      185,000  1.2761%      $ 2,361    ($ 1,280) 




1st Floor Area (sq.ft.)              1,000   Frontage (ft.):  50 
2nd Floor Area (sq.ft.)              1,000   Depth (ft.):  110 
Basement Area (sq.ft.)              1,000   Lot Size (sq.ft.)              5,500 
Baths: 1.5    Year  Built:  1970 
Attached Garage:  1       
 
Source:  City of Toronto, “Comparison of Residential Property Taxes on Similar Single Family Homes 
in Selected Ontario Toronto,” A Report Prepared by the Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer for the 
Policy and Finance Committee, April 17, 2001.  The Table was based on information obtained from the 













The new city has attempted to cut costs by reducing some of the duplication that existed in the six 
former lower-tier governments.  However, the scope for cost reduction is not large since 73% of the 
city’s operating budget consists of programs previously amalgamated under Metro.   
 
The new city still faces two significant budget problems.  The first one is that the wage and salary 
arbitration decisions discussed earlier will significantly increase future costs. The second is the 
increasing debt burden from its decision to finance capital expenditures by borrowing from the 
province and the capital market. 
 
Revenue Sources Opened to the New City   
 
The city is constrained in its ability to raise additional revenue.  Municipalities in Ontario can obtain 
revenue from the property tax on residential, commercial, and industrial and other forms of real estate.  
The province set seven standard classes of property for tax purposes, but it can create additional 
classes.
 (45) Municipalities can also obtain revenue from fees on the sale of services. 
  
Prior to 1998, school boards were allowed to impose taxes on real estate.  However, under The 
Education Quality Improvement Act, 1997 (Bill 160), the province took control of the funding of 
education. The province assumed responsibility for setting education rates by regulation for all 
property classes.  The revenue raised is collected by the municipalities and turned over to the school 
boards. 
 
In 1998, residential taxes for education purposes were reduced by almost $2.5 billion or 50 percent. 
(46) 
This allowed the municipalities to increase their revenue from the residential property tax and to help 
pay for the additional responsibilities shifted from the province to the municipalities.  The rate set for 
1998 was 46%. This was reduced in 1999 to 41.14%.  The intention is to reduce the rate by an 
additional 10% over the next 5 years.   
 
Increases in the education rates on business property because of property tax reform have been capped 
by the province at 10% for 1998, an additional 5% for 1999 and an additional 5% for 2000.  Starting in 
1998, education taxes are being phased down to the provincial average rate in those municipalities 
were the rate is above the provincial average. 
(47) 
  
In 2001, the province passed Bill 140, “An Act to Amend the Assessment Act, Municipal Act and other 
Acts with respect to Property Taxes” which gives the province control over how the property tax can 
be applied to commercial property.  Under the Act, the Provincial Treasurer can determine a provincial 
average tax ratio, which was set at 1.417 for 2001. The ratio is calculated by dividing the residential tax 
rate into the commercial tax rate.  Any municipality with a commercial tax rate greater than 1.417 
cannot increase its tax revenue by imposing additional taxes on commercial property.  Since Toronto’s 
ratio in January 2001 was 4.27, only the residential property tax rate could be increased to raise 
additional revenue. 
(48)    
 
The ratio for Toronto is much higher than in the rest of the GTA.  For example, the ratios for Peel and 
York Regions are close to or less than 1.417 
(49) Also, the provincial government’s share of the 
commercial property tax rate varies across the province.  The rate in Toronto is higher than in any other 
municipality in Ontario.  Comparing Toronto and Mississauga, the rate in Toronto is almost twice the 
rate imposed in Mississauga.  Businesses in Toronto are at a significant cost disadvantage compared 





Residential Property Taxes in Toronto 
 
Bill 140 restricts the revenue sources opened to the city to the residential property tax and user fees. 
The prevailing view in the provincial government and among municipalities in the rest of Ontario is 
that Toronto’s residential property taxes are low compared with the rest of Ontario. Premier Harris has 
stated, “residents in North Bay pay more residential taxes than do residents in Toronto”. 
(50)  
 
A recent study prepared by the city shows that the residential property tax rates are lower in Toronto 
than in other municipalities in Ontario. However, the assessed value of a standard home is significantly 
higher in Toronto than in the rest of Ontario. Table 4 shows that because of the higher tax base, the 




A recent paper by Robert Bish supports the problems facing the City of Toronto as a result of 
amalgamation and downloading.  
(51) Bish provides an excellent discussion of the major issues related 
to municipal amalgamation. As Bish notes, the 21st century will require institutional adaptability to 
rapid change. “Yet in the critical area of the relationship among citizens, the civil community and local 
governance, some provincial governments are imposing an intellectual fashion of the ninetieth century 
in the form of an almost religious faith in monolithic government organizations and central control.” 
(52) 
 
After examining a large number of studies on municipal amalgamations, Bish concludes, “smaller 
governments can cost less…because they can take advantage of specialization and trade in markets.” 
(53) More importantly, when looking at a proposed amalgamation, “do not base recommendations on a 
comparison of the actual situation with an ideal. Such ideals are virtually always ideas from the past 
that are obsolete by the time they became popular.” 
(54) 
 
What has happened in Toronto is consistent with Bish’s conclusions. More importantly, Toronto is one 
of the main engines of growth for both Ontario and the rest of Canada. If provincial and federal 
Governments continue to deny additional funds to Toronto and to restrict the tax sources open to the 
city, the cost of living and of doing business in Toronto will continue to increase. Toronto’s ability to 
provide the services required to attract and retain businesses and residents will continue to decline. 
This will seriously handicap Toronto’s growth generating capacity and reduce Ontario and Canada’s 




Appendix Table 1 
Changes in Responsibilities of the Provincial and Municipal Governments 
as a result of the Local Realignment of Services (LRS) Program 
 
Service Before  LRS After  LRS 








Most social and community services were either 
funded by the province or cost shared with the 
municipalities under the General Welfare 
Assistance Act, the Family Benefits Act, and the 
Vocational Rehabilitation Act. These programs 
were replaced by the Social Assistance Reform Act 
 (1997).  Under the new Act, the provincial 
government created the Ontario Works Act (1997), 
and the Ontario Disability Support Act (1997).  
These Acts significantly changed the social 
assistance programs.    
 
The Ontario Works Act insures that financial and employment 
assistance is available for people in need. However, it also 
encourages such people to become self-sufficient.  (Section 4-1) 
 
 
To be eligible for the Ontario 
Works Program, a recipient 
must take training to help them 
become employable.    
 
Drug Benefits for people on 
this Program. 
 
100% provincial   Municipalities fund and deliver the program.  
Assistance, 80% provincial/ 20%municipal 
Implementation, 80 provincial %/ 20% municipal 
Administration, 50%provincial /50%municipal 
 
80%provincial/20%municipal (Section 4.2) 
Sole Parent Support (now part 
of Ontario Works Program).  
 
100% provincial  Benefits, 80%provincial /20%municipal                                        
              
Administration, 50%provincipal/50% municipal 
(Section 4.2)  




Allowances and Benefits, 100% provincial 
Administration, 100% provincial 





Child Care   100% provincial  Program Costs, 80% provincial/20%municipal   
Administration, 50% provincial/50%municipal   
(Section 4.3) 
Long-term Care  100% provincial  50%provincial/50%municipal 
(Province of Ontario “Who Does What Reforms”, 1997) 
 
Hostels  80% provincial /20%municipal  Transferred to the municipalities. 
(Province of Ontario “Who Does What Reforms”, 1997). In June 
1998, the province announced that hostels would be cost shared 
on a 80% provincial/20%municipal bases retroactive to January 
1, 1998. (Section 4.6) 
 
Homes for Special Care  100% provincial  50%provincial/ 50%municipal 
(Province of Ontario “Who Does What Reforms”, 1997) 
 
Public Health 
The new program is based on 
the Health Protection and 
Promotion Act (1997) as 
amended by the Services 





The province sets the standards, but the 
municipalities or local Boards of Health delivered 
the services. Funding was 100% provincial. 
The province sets the standards. The municipalities or local 
Boards of Health deliver the services.  After 1998, the programs 
were funded 100% by the municipalities, except for certain 
designated services, such as vaccines, which are funded 100% by 
the province. On March 23, 1999, the province agreed to pay 
50% of the costs, except for the designated programs, which are 
100% funded by the province.  The administration and the cost 
of the administration of the program were transferred to the 
municipalities.   
(Section 4.4) 
 
Land Ambulance Services  
The changes are based on the 
Ambulance Act as amended by 
the Services Improvement Act 
(1997), and the Tax Credit and 
Revenue Protection Act 
(1998). 
 
100% provincial  The cost of operation, equipment and administration was 
transferred to the municipalities after January 1, 1998.  The 
transfer was to be completed by January 1, 2001.  On March 23, 
1999, the province changed the program and agreed to 50%/50% 
cost sharing with the municipalities.  




The changes are set out in 
Schedule F of The Services 
Improvement Act (1997). 
This involves the transfer of   
costs to the municipalities, the 
reform and simplification of 
administration, and the transfer 
of responsibility for social 
housing to Consolidated 
Municipal Service Managers. 
Changes were also made to the 




Social housing was owned by the federal, 
provincial and municipal governments. Some 
privately owned housing also received subsidies 
from the Federal and provincial governments. The 
Federal and provincial governments paid the costs 
of social housing.   
The first stage of social housing devolution started on January 1, 
1998, when the province began to charge the municipalities for 
the cost of social housing. After a Federal-Provincial Agreement 
was negotiated, the province would begin to simplify program 
administration based on the recommendations of advisory 
groups. The Report of the Social Housing Committee was 
released in August 1998. The third and final stage was to transfer 
most of the responsibility for administration and for provincial 
cost to the municipalities.  Some exceptions included dedicated 
supportive housing for people who need support services to live 
independently.  Provincial costs and administrative responsibility 
were transferred to the municipalities. In the GTA, the Local 
Services Alignment Program (see below) mandated cost sharing 
of social housing in the GTA among the five local governments 
of Toronto, Peel, York, Durham and Halton.  
(Section 4.6) 
Women’s Shelter’s  
 
 
80%provincial /20% municipal  100% provincial. (Province of Ontario “Who Does What 
Reforms”, 1997). 
Municipal Transit, Operating 
and Capital Cost. 
 
Cost shared   100% municipal  






100% provincial  Responsibility for funding and operation was transferred to the 
GTSB on January 1, 1998.   
The capital and operating costs are meet from Go Transit 
revenue and from funding obtained from the five GTA 




Ferries  Provincial with some shared costs.   Ferries serving local needs were transferred to the municipalities. 
Other ferries, such as the Glenora and Abitibi Ferries are 
provincially funded. (Province of Ontario “Who Does What 
Reforms”, 1997)  
 
Municipal Airports  100% provincial  Responsibility for the operating and capital costs was transferred 




Roads and Bridges 
This program is based on the 
Public Transportation and 
Highways Improvement Act. 
 
 
Cost shared by the province and the municipalities.  The municipalities were made responsible for all roads and 
bridges that serve local needs, except in sparsely populated areas. 
 On January 1, 1998, the municipalities were responsible for 
3,400 km of highways. Another 1,775 km. of provincial highway 
were transferred to the municipalities in 1997. The province 
provided the municipalities with a one-time grant of $275 
million for capital and maintenance needs.  
(Section 5.4 and 5.5) 
 
Water and Sewage Facilities 
operated under the Ontario 
Clean Water Agency. 
The Water and Sewage 
Improvement Act (1997). 
 
 
25%P/75% municipal  All provincially owned water and sewage facilities have been 
transferred to the municipalities. The transfer began in late 1997 
and it was being phased in over a two-year period. municipalities 
selling water and sewage works to the private sector will be 
required to repay all provincial construction grants paid for the 




(Services Improvement Act, 
1997) 
 
Approval and inspection, was 100% provincial. 
This is still true for larger or communal sewage 
systems. 
As of April 6, 1998, regulatory authority for approval and 
inspection of smaller-on-lot sewage systems was transferred to 
local governments.  User fees cover the cost. (Section 5-6). 
Policing (Ontario Provincial 
Police) 
 
This was a provincial responsibility. The Police 
Services Act is under the jurisdiction of the 
Solicitor General.  Amendments to the Act were 
made in November 1997. (Section 3.1)  The Act 
sets out the requirements that a municipality must 
meet for policing services. Before 1997, the 
province paid the cost of Ontario Provincial Police 
services for many municipalities.  (Section 3.2) 
 
Under the amended Act, the municipalities now pay for all OPP 
policing. In municipalities that have their own police force, the 
municipality pays the cost of policing.   
(Section 3.1)  
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Property Tax Assessment  Provincial, under the Provincial Assessment 
Commissioner. The province is still responsible for 
setting standards and polices for the new 
assessment system.  
 
The province set up the Ontario Property Assessment 
Corporation (OPAC) on December 31, 1998. OPAC assesses 
property based on its market value assessment. Municipalities 
now deliver and fund assessment services. 
(Sections 2.1 and 2.2) 
When market value assessment was introduced, the assessments 
were based on 1996 values. These were updated using 1999 
values for 2001 to 2003 taxes. The next assessments are to be 
done annually and the assessed values are to be based on 3 year 
moving averages.  
(Section 2.11)  
 
Libraries  The municipalities and the province shared the cost 
of this service. 
The municipalities are responsibly for local library services. The 
province continues to support the system through funding of the 
province wide network of shared resources, and the 
telecommunication links to connect the libraries to the global 
information network. (Province of Ontario “Who Does What 
Reforms”, 1997) 
 
Provincial Offences Act  100% provincial   Administration, prosecution, and court support for some offences 
now municipal. The municipalities now also received the 
revenue from any fines paid. (Section 7.1) 
 
Education  Local School Boards set the tax rates on all classes 
of municipal property and the municipalities 
collected and remitted the revenue to the Public, 
Catholic and French language school boards. The 
curriculum was a joint provincial and school board 
responsibility.  
Under the Education Quality Improvement Act, 1997 (Bill 160), 
the province sets the education property tax rates for all classes 
of property. The taxes are collected by the municipalities and 
given to the School boards based on their enrollments. The funds 
collected from the tax on business are shared among all the 
municipalities. The province also provides grants to School 
Boards from general revenues based on student needs. The tax 
rates set on residential property have been reduced from 46% in 
1998 to 41.14% in 1999. They are to be reduced by a further 
10% over the next ten years. This is done to give the 
municipalities more revenue from the residential tax rates to help 
pay for their increased responsibilities. (Section 2.3) 
 
Source: Association of Municipalities of Ontario, “ Local Service Realignment, a user’s guide”, Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1999. The section 
numbers in the Table refer to the sections in the Guide where the information was obtained.  Some information was also obtained from the Province 
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